

Voting and Computer Science

Examples:

- ① Rank aggregation.
- e.g., combining multiple ranked lists into a "consensus" list.
(Note: A bracket above "ranked lists" is labeled "≈ votes")
- ② Crowdsourcing.
- e.g., combining opinions or grades
(Note: "combining opinions" is labeled "e.g., in Mechanical Turk" and "grades" is labeled "e.g., peer grading in a MOOC")
- ③ Participatory democracy.
- e.g., budgeting decisions (which public projects get funded?)
- technology makes voting easier, enables new types of voting (next)

Participatory Budgeting

Setup: known budget B , possible projects + their costs.

- constraint: total cost of chosen projects is at most B .

Example: budget $B = \$1M$, costs $c_1 = \$1M$, $c_2 = \$500k$, $c_3 = \$500k$.

k-Approval Voting: ① Each voter votes for at most k projects.

② Sort projects in decreasing order of # of votes.

③ fund projects in this order until full budget is spent. [last project only partially funded]

Example con'd: value per voter = $\$4$ for project #1, $\$3$ for #2, $\$2$ for #3

Issue: voters not forced to take project costs into consideration, risk of non-Pareto-optimal outcome.

Knapsack Voting ([URL: pbstanford.org](http://url.pbstanford.org))

- ① Each voter votes for a subset S_i of projects with total cost $\leq B$.
- ② Sort projects in decreasing order of # of votes.
- ③ Fund projects in this order until budget is fully spent.

Note: in example, plausible that most voters will vote for #2 + #3 rather than just #1 — results in Pareto optimal outcome!
(reason: voters forced to take into account project costs)

Note: probably too complicated for a paper ballot
(but ok with a computer interface).

Properties of Knapsack Voting

Assumptions: (strong)

- ① Voter i wants to fund the projects S_i^* with total cost $\leq B$.
- ② Wants to maximize money spent on the projects in S_i^* .

$$[\text{utility} = \sum_{j \in S_i^*} [\text{funding to project } j]]$$

Properties: ① Truthful voting (i.e., vote for projects in S_i^*) a dominant strategy.

[intuition: dishonest vote can only divert funds from S_i^* to other projects]

② Truthful voting \Rightarrow Pareto-optimal outcome. [can't make anyone better off without making someone worse off]

[intuition: any diversion of funds from a more popular to a less popular project makes someone worse off]